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This study investigated the effects of six communication/information
conditions on the outcomes reached by three-person groups playing a market
game. The game consisted of a monopolist and two weaker players. The
conditions consisted of six combinations which varied the amount of infor-
mation available to the players and their ability to communicate with one
another. The relationship between the data and several different gasne
theoretic solution concepts was also investigated. The results indicated
that the monopolists' payoffs depended to a large extent on the communication/
information conditions. Announcement of the payoff division and especially
the availability of messages tended no reduce his payoffs. In conditions
where no messages were allowed, his payoffs increased over time. Although
the data diverged significantly from the core, the situations which contri-
buted to greater competition resulted in outcomes closer to the core. In
addition, a comparison between von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions and the
more general class of subsolutions indicated that subsolutions were more
reflective of the behavior observed. Directions for future research were
suggested.
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The selection of a rational alternative in strategic situations has been
discussed under the rubric of game theory since its inception in 1944 [18].
Slice that time, several solution concepts have been presented which indicate
what are generally referred to as ''stable" sets of outcomes. At this time,
; .over, the mathematical derivation of theory has far outdistanced the
behaviorists' attempts to test game theory's different outcome sets. The
present paper , therefore, attempts to begin filling this void in the exper-
imental research. It is an attempt to address the problem of determining
those circumstances which promote different stable outcomes.
The solution concepts which have eceived the most attention include the
class of solutions [18} , the value [15] , the bargaining set [2], and the
closely related kernel [4 J and nucleolus [14] . More recent work considers
the competitive bargaining set [6] which is a subset of the bargaining set,
ard the class ol subsolutions [12J which generalizes the class of von Neumann
ard Morgenstern (vN-M) solutions.
Previous Research
The first study to examine the applicability of game theoretic solution
concepts to human behavior was conducted by Kalisch, Milnor ? Nash, and
Nering [9]. This study investigated several games and concluded that, in
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relation to the outcome sets of the relevant theories, the Shapley value
received some support from the data, while other solution concepts were
neither supported nor rejected. The studies also indicated that (1) per-
sonalities in face-to-face bargaininq hid a strong impact on the results ,-
and (2) repeated trials with a fixed set of players v/ould be necessary to
observe the type of stability that would allow a test of the vN-M solution
set.
A subsequent study by Maschler [11] investigated the applicability of
the bargaining set and the kernel of three-person games. The overall results
favored the bargaining set over the kernel.
More recent research has also investigated the bargaining set 17] , [8]
,
including the kernel and the competitive bargaining set, and vN-M solutions
[3] , [16] . In addition to considering the applicability of game theory to
behavior, these studies have consistently investigated several aspects of
the communication opportunities of the game participants.
The studies conducted at the University of North Carolina [7] , [8] have
shown a marked increase in the sophistication and precision of the experimental
research on games. These studies have used a computerized procedure which allows
the game players to send and receive offers from other players who are identified
only by a letter (A, B, or C) . The standard procedure entails irotating the
players through different positions oi the same game, allowing the researchers
to obtain results which are independent of the position each player holds
while also allowing for learning to occur over trials.
In an experiment which resembles the present study, Kahan and Rapaport [8]
used a class of characteristic function games which have the special property
that v(A)=v(3)=v(C)=v(ABC)=0 and v(AB) , v{AC) , and v(BC) are all positive but
not necessarily equal to one another. These games are called quota games,
because quotas, a, , can be assigned to each player such that the payoffs to
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any two-person coalition satisfy i
v ( i i ) ~Ui . +Ui
where i, j=A, B, and C, and i^j. The bargaining set, the kernel, and the
competitive bargaining set. all cons.' : outcomes such that, regardless of
which coalition forms, the payc . ' '. ach individual is his quota,
Kahan and Kapaport [8] also manipulated a c< Lcation variable in
each of the quota games they used. Subjects in one condition were constrained
to present offers only when it was their turn and were not allowed to send
secret messages, while still communicating in turn. The final condition
permitted subjects to send secret messages and to make offers at any time.
The overall findings were consistent with the bargaining set, the competitive
bargaining set, and the kernel. However, no differences were found for the
communicat ion var i abl e
.
Other studies have found differences due to communication opportunities.
Buckley and Westen [3] reported findings which indicated that the frequency
with which coalitions failed to form increased when communication was restricted
to the passing of written messages (versus face-to- face bargaining) . Horowitz
and Rapaport [7] , who investigated Apex games where the Apex player must be
either included in a winning two-person coalition or must be the only player
excluded from a winning coalition composed of all the other players, found
the Apex player's payoffs were significantly larger in conditions where he
rnad« the first offer rather than the last.
The disparity in the data reported to date on the effects of contmunicati
opportunities on the payoffs in game situations may be related to the particular
procedures used in the different experiments. However, the original points **- e
by Kalisch, et al . [91 , that personalities affect the outcomes and that vN-M
solutions could not be tested when players rotate between different positions,,
remain valid. In addition, the previous studies have tested only a small number
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of the communication variations which are possible and have also considered
only a small number of the solution concepts which may be applicable. The
present study focuses or. three solution concepts, the core", vN-M solutions
,
and subsoiutions, under six conditions ./here communi< is possible or
where information is available. The desi< therefore, allows for a more
complete analysis of the effects of coj i . and information on several
prominent solution concepts,,
The Game
The game under consideration was presented to our subjects as a market
consisting of three players, each of whom is the owner of one shoe. At
each period player A owns a right shoe while players B and C each own one
left shoe. Single, shoes have no value, but a pair of shoes (consisting of
one right shoe and one left shoe) can be sold for 100 points. Thus, no
player acting alone has the power to earn any income from the market, but
any coalition of players which can assemble a pair of shoes has the power
to earn 100 points.
This game can be modeled in characteristic function form where N - (A, &,*
and v(A)=*v(B)=v(C)=v(8C)=G and v{A3}=v'AC)=v(ABC}=lo The set of outcomes of
this game is the set X of ail possible distributions of 100 points among the
players. This set can be represented geometrically using barycentric coor-
dinates on a simplex. In Figure : ordinates of a typical point, x ex,
are shown. Also shown are the coordinates associated with each vertex of the
Insert Figure 1 about here.
triangle, each corresponding to one of the players. Every outcome of the
game corresponds to precisely one point in the triangle of height one and
vice versa as shown in Figure 1.
Following standard game theoretic usage, an outcome x = (x^x x^}
dominates another oirfccome y = (y^Y-V-) if there exists a coalition of players
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ICN which prefers the outcome x to the outcome y and has sufficient power-
to assure to its members the distribution of wealth they receive at x.
Formally, x dominates y (x >• y) if there exi coalition IfcN such that
for each player is I, x. > v., and L x. < v(I) . Thus, there can be no dom-
i A 3 —
is I
ination by the grand coalition m, and, examining the characteristic function
of our game, we see chat all the coalitions (A,B) and
(A,C) , since these are U Ly other coalitions whose characteristic functions
are not equal to zero.
We define the dominion of an outcome x to be the set of all outcomes
which are dominated by the point x and denote it by D(x) - {ysxjx^ y}. The
dominion of a typical point x is shown by the shaded region in Figure 2. We
define the dominion of a set of outcomes SS.X to be the set of outcomes dom-
inated by some point in S and denote it D(S) = £D(x). The complement of this
xcS
set; i.e., the set of outcomes which are undominated by any point in S, is
denoted by U(S) = X-D{S>.
The domination relation can be interpreted intuitively as a "force"
acting on the game; if an outcome x dominates an outcome y, then there is
a coalition of players with both the incentive and the power to "move" the
game from y toward x.
One set which lered stable i ! • respect ( ruination is
the set of outcomes which are undominated by any other outcome. This set,
called the core of the game, can be denoted by the set of outcomes C = U(X).
For the special case of games in characteristic function form, the core is
equal to the set C ~ {xeXjZx >_ v(I) for all coalitions ICN.}.
This set may be empty; most games which have been studied experimentally
have, in fact, an empty core.
For this particular game (see Figure 2) , the core is non-empty and
consists of the single outcome C = (100,0,0), at which player A receives
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100 points, and players B and C receive sero. Any outcome y outside of the
Insert Figure 2 about here.
core is unstable in the sense that it ran foe dominated by some other outcome
x? i.e., if y is outside of cne core, tJ here Is some coalition of players
which prefers x to y.and has the power to ! cg x.
In this game the core coincides with ;ue competitive equilibrium
of the market. In genera] , it can be shown that t ore of any market game
contains every competitive equilibrium,, There is a considerable body of
theory (e.g.. [II, [53) which supports the intuitive notion that outcomes
in the core result from very competitive play.
A more comprehensive notion of stability is a vN-M solution which is
defined to be any set of outcomes SCX such, that (1) No x in S dominates any
y in S? and (2) Every z outside of S is dominated by some x in S. Condition
(1) is called internal stability and condition (2) is called external stability,
Equivalently, a solution is a set S such that S - U{S}„
von Neumann and Morgenstern interpreted solutions as "standards of
behavior" which , once they became generally ted, would create expec-
tations which v ->uid be self-enforcing. Th< iutions of his particular
game are all the arcs of the form 2{p) - ; .. < p < 100, where
f and g are continuous sgative and functions such that
p + f(p) + g(p) *s 100. Every sol ' a game contains the core, and for
this game, every solution also cor >int at which player A receives
zero. Solutions of this game can be viewed as arising from bargaining by
players B and C acting cooperatively against player A,
Another kind of stable set, which can be viewed, as somewhat intermediate
between the core and a VN-M solution, is the subsolution [121 which can be




(II) S = D (S) = U(U{S))
.
It can easily be shown that every solution is a maximal suhsolution, and
that every subsolution contain." e. P is game, the subs< Lons
are the arcs of the form Zip) for < c <_ p < 100 , w) Z(p) is defined as
before.
The most significant diffes between solutions and subsoiutions as
stable standards of behavior for the game in question is that in order to be
a viNI-M solution, a standard of behavior must include the possibility that
player A will receive zero whereas the class of subsoiutions includes
standards of behavior in which player A is assured of receiving some
strictly positive amount. For example, the arc 2{p) = (p, 1 ~ p/2 f 1 -p/2)
where p varies between Q and 100 is a solution;: It includes the possibility
that player A will receive p - 0. A related subsolution, for example, might
not permit p to drop below some strictly positive value c.
The game chosen for this study has the property that its core i* <*n
extreme point of the set of possible outcomes. It is an essentially coop-
erative game because wo 'layers must reach an agreement before
any payoff is obtained,
Differences in the te with the ars and
differences in the amount of can alter the
complexion of the game, especially Lved by the players.
Situations where, the weaker players cannot communicate with one another
or where they have little rmation aboi te negotiations should be
advantageous to the strong player. If he c&Vi alienate the weaker playe:
so that they do not form a blocking coalition, he can reap larger and
larger payoffs. If, however, the weaker players are given the ability to
communicate and are given some information about the negotiations, they may
be able to cooperate against the strong player and block his power plays.

Different analytic techniques were usea to compare the data to the
(unique) core, than were used to determine if the many individual outcomes
constituted a solution or subsolutioiu The outcomes for each experimental
condition were compared to determine they were consistent with the
hypothesis that they derived from a common solution or subsolution. In
addition, the impact of the six communication/information conditions on
the payoffs and the demands of the players was assessed using standard
statistical techniques.
METHOD
Subjects . The subjects in this experiment were 117 male undergraduates
enrolled in the introductory organizational behavior course at a large
midwestern university. All subjects received credit toward a course
requirement for participatin.,
Design, Three factors were manipulated: (1) secret or announced pay'
divisions; (2) announced messages, secret messages, or no messages at all/
and (3) secret or announced offers . A complete factorial design (i.e., 2
payoff division conditions by 3 message conditions by 2 offer conditions)
would have resulted in twelve conditions However, s the conditions
were either conceptually impossible, ai .. repetition of information,
or actually announced repetitive information. The six conditions which
resulted in distinctly different situations were: (i) secret payoff
division-no messages-secret offers; (2 5 announced payoff division-no mes-
sages-secret offers; (3) announced payoff divisions-no messages-announced offers;
(4) announced payoff divisions-secret messages- secret offers; (5) announced
payoff divisions-secret messages-announced offers; and (6) announced payoff
divisions-announced messages-announced offers (see Figure 3}
.
The six conditions can be intuitively arranged from Condition 1, which
gives players the least information and which therefore should have led to
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the most competitive situation, and results closest to the core, to
Condition 6, which gives the players the most information and which should
have fostered the most cooperation between the weaker players and results
farthest from the core. In addition , selected conditions v.; ere isolated to
analyze the independent and interactive effects of the three independent
variables. Specifically, the effects of announcing the payoff division was
tested by comparing Condil cts of allowing and announcing
messages was tested by comparing Conditions 3, S, and 6, Th< affects of
announcing offers was rested by comparing Conditions 2 and 4 with Conditions
3 and 5. Finally, the interaction between secret/no messages and secret/
announced offers was tested by comparing Conditions 2, 3, 4, and 5.
Procedure. Each of the three players was seated behind partitions which
shielded him from the other subjects and from the experimenter. The par-
ticipants were given written instructions which were also read aloud by
the experimenter. The instructions presented the game (described earlier)
and the following (summarized) information: "Your task is to bargain among
yourselves to det.ermi.ne who will sell their shoes and how the sellers will
divide their payoff. We will repeat this procedure several times, with
each x3layer assuming the same position time." The players were then
instructed in the mechanics of th experii t lach player filled out offer
slips which consisted of the choice of a bargaining partner and a proposed
payoff division totalling 10i . The players sent their offer slips
through a slot in the partitions to the experimenter. After all the players
had submitted offer slips, the e nenter recorded the trial number on each
slip and passed the offers to the appropriate parties. Upon receiving one
or more offer slips, each player could accept at most one of the offers. An
agreement was reached when an offer was accepted. However, in the case of
more than one acceptance, each, player was bound to the offer he had made.
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In other words, if a person made an of as accepted, he was he'd
to that offer, even if he had accepted an or another agr In
cases where two players accepted eac3 . ' offers but the payoff divisions
were different, the average cf the two payoff divisions was recorded, This
procedure was repeated for 12 eced * mti] out.
In the groups where the pa off di secret, the experimenter
only announced the positions' of the players led an agreement.
When the payoff division was announced,, t experimenter also revealed the
number of points each player had received from their agreement.
When secret messages were allowed, any of the players could write any
message lie wished to any of the other players. Messages were delivered in
the same way that offer slips were delivered. When the messages were
announced, the experimenter announced who had sent the message, who was
to receive it, and the contents of the message. The message was then
delivered.
The announced offers conditions were very similar to the announced
messages conditions The sender, the recipient, and the contents of eac
offer were announced. In addition, aij acceptances and lejecticns were
announced
.
Each group completed 12 ider one of the 6 cond s. No
group experienced more than one condition. At the end cf ! • sxperiraent,




The results v-rich follow report on the analysis of the data for 36 of
the 39 groups which participated in the study . Three of the groups (one i
Condition 4, two in Condition 6) took such a long time negotiating that they
had to be excused before 12 trials could be completed. One group required
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33 rounds to come to their first agreement! Even more surprising is the fact
that the weak, players in this group did not reach an. agreement between them-*
selves to thwart the strong player. Rather, the strong player would not
accept an offer that did not yield hint 70 of the 100 points. In the other
two groups, both in Condition 6, the weak players again did not reach an
agreement. However, each pair of weak players continued to demand a
coalition which included all thre< :s. In additic l -ere were a
large number of messages r :hese q- and the fa at the experimenter
was required to read them ail slowed progress considerably.
Comparisons with Theory
There were substantial variations in the "patterns" taken by the
negotiations within, the groups. In an attempt to depict the data with some
precision, the payoffs received by the players in position A were averaged
for each condition. In addition, average payoffs were computed for the
"stronger" and "'weaker 5 ' of players B and C fo:; each group. The "stronger"
of the two was tie fined as the | c who obtained the higher payoff. For
ease of discussion , the "stronger" of the two will be arbitrarily designated
player "B", fcl 2 "weaker" was called p." Iyer MC". Figure \ shows the payoffs
for each of the three players for each of the six conditions, The figure
Insert Figure 4 about hei
indicates that the points define an a3 c which is contained in a vN-M
solution and consequently, also in a subsolution. However, the arc does
not extend lower than a payoff of 56.47 for the strong player. This;
observation is consistent with the hypothesis that the standard of behavior
is a subsolution in which player A will not accept too low an offer.
This result was further investigated by considering the impact of the
independent variables on the offers which were minimally acceptable to A.

In addition to the original independent variables each of
the analyses used the following two variable (1) the minimum demand made
by A versus the smallest offer he accented from the weaker players; and (2)
the lowest acceptable offer versus the >< lowest a able offer. The
lowest/second lowest variable was
:
lard against the relatively fre-
quent situations where A demanded - - the first trial but there-
after increased his demands, and where A sen-; an offer for the three-person
coalition only to indicate to the weaker players that they could do better
if they worked exclusively with him.
The analysis which included all six conditions revealed significant
conditions and lowest/second lowest main effects (F(5,30) - 2.72, £ < ,04*
and F(i,30) - 23.77
, £ < .00003,. respectively), and two effects which approached
standard significance levels: the demands/accepts variable (F(l,30) ~ 1.99,
£ < .175); and the conditions x lowest/second lowest interation (F(5,30) « 2.41,
p < .061}. The means for each of the conditions are shown in Table 2. A dir*5 '
_
Insert Table 2 about h<
parallel between A' s payoffs and his minima] table offer is readily
apparent. The lowest. /second lowest main effect revealed that h would




that he would not >ne (X _ - - 54.58). Thee xmd lowe
marginal demands/accepts effect shewed that ^ r s minimum demand was lower
(X « 50.4) than the lowest offer he was willing to accept (X = 53.0). The
conditions by lowest/second lowest interaction depended to a large extent on
the large difference between the lowest and the second lowest offers accepted
in Condition 3 (X * 46.9 and X =* 60.9, respectively). in the other conditions,
the differences approximated only three points.
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Subsequent analyses for each of the independent variables revealed that
the announcement of the payoff division reduced A's minimally acceptable, offer
(X . ~ 52.02; X , = 67.17). However, this effect was only
announced not announced *
marginally significant: P(l,10> - 4*05, n < ,075.
An interaction was also found between the messages variable and the
lowest, second lowest variable: F(2,-15) » 4.34. £ < ,035; see Table 3.
Post hoc tests indicate that, as before, the major differences occurred in
the no message condition (Condition 3); it. is the only condition where the
lowest and second lowest acceptable offer differed significantly from one
another.
Payoffs to the Strong Player
An analysis of A s s payoffs in the six different conditions over the 12
trials indicated that both the conditions and the trials variables had sig-
nificant effects: P(5,3Q) * 3.09, £ - and F(ll, 330) - 2.28, p_ < .02,
respectively. The conditions main effect (see Table 1) revealed that the
expected drop in the strong players' payoffs when the players were able to
exchange or receive more and more information (i.e., send or hear messages
or hear the •:»: announced) was tnt: rely supported In Condition 1,
where the offers and the payoff division ed and where there
was no opportunity to sand messages, p iyoffs as
anticipated. Howevi payof i Condition 3,
where the offers an were announced and no messages were allowed.
Post hoc analysis, using the Newman-Kuels procedure [171, revealed that A's
payoffs in these two conditions were significantly larger than A's payoffs
in Condition 4 , where the pa ^on was announced and the offers and
messages were secret. Inspection of Table 1 also suggests that the availa-
bility of messages (either secret or announced) had the greatest impact on
A ' s payoffs
.

In order to better grasp th ailing of ; Lficant trials main effect,
the 12 trials were divided ocks, each comprised of 3 completed
trials. As expected^ analysis o ignificant main
effect: F(3.90) ~ 4.33, p < . 0( s of this finding, again
using the Newraan-Kuels j payoffs increased signif-
icantly from the first to the se< 61.07; X . = 65.01)
st second
and that his payoffs did not i - in subsequent trial blocks
OLx. j = 67.02; X £ _ = 66third fourth
A more detailed analysis strong player's payoffs was lucted
for each of the independent variables. The first analysis investigated the
effects of the announcement of the payoff division. The results (P(l,10) = 4,04,
.075) suggested that announcing the payoff division reduced A's payoff
* 76.7; X . « 65.2)
.
secret announced
The analysis of c vs. no messages and secret vs. announced offers
yielded suggestive findings for both the messages and the offers variables.
The messages main effect (F(l,20) = 3.64, £ < .075) indicated that no mes-
sages favored the strong player (A's mean payoff equaled 67.65), while secret
messages favored the weaker players (A's pa; -as 58.93), The effei
for offers was unexpected h it di iVentional levels of
significance (F(l,2< - l.K when everyone's offers
were announced (X ~ 60.62- , - 65.76
These anaij Lso resulted in = i cant interaction between
messages and trials (F(li, 220} - 1 and hi v n messages and
blocks (p{3.60) « 3.40, £ < ,025). Post hoc analysis of the message
block interaction showed that A's payoffs si Lcantly increased as the
blocks progressed in the no message tions, but they did not change
significantly in t- ret xfeessag« .. Although A's payoffs
were not different i bl . tw j message conditions during the first block,
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A was able to gain an advantage as the trials progressed if the players were
not allowed to send messages to one another.
Although not all the effects were conventionally significant, the
entire set of analyses conceri licates t iat: 11) announce-
ment of the payoff division ced A's payoffs; (2) announcement of the
players" offers increased A's payoffs; iilafoility of messages
decreased A* s pay- and (4) when no messages were allowed,, A's payoffs
increased over the trials.
The Players ' Demands
The analyses of the players" demands were conducted to investigate the
effects of the independent variables as the trials progressed- As before,
the analyses were run for both trials and blocks (where the trials were
partitioned into four 3-trial blocks) . The two analyses, however, were
not consistent, possibly due to the necessity of using quasi P- ratios [13]
in the blocks analyses.
The conditions had a sign! ficant impact o st: i pi lyers ' demands
(see Table 1) for both ana F(5»30) = 2.91, g < .03 in the trials
analysis; F(5, 2,62, o < ,05 h lysis. The strong
players' demand Lried significantly er tria 3.25,
£ < .0004) and varied at marginal significance o fcs (P(4,37) - 2.54,
£ < - 07 )- EB?-'1 h9P analysis of the sign for trials indicated
that the strong players 11 demands on the XL 58.8) were signif-
cantly different from his demands on trials 5 and 7 through 12 (66 8 < X < 71.1)
at the .05 level using Mewman-Kuels procedure. In addition, a significant
interaction between conditions -and trials (F (55, 330) - 1.80, £ < .0011) w<
found for A's demands, but the interaction between conditions and blocks dxd
not approach significance (F < 1) . The significant interaction was probably
the result of an unexpected finding in the payoff announced-no messages-offers

announced condition (C< on 4) ; li mai .' om a mean of
51.7 on the first trial to >n 1 t Lai. While increases i
A s s demands were I il of jqos trial; is evidenced by the trials
main effect), this increase muc - er than any other. It should also
be noted that the blocks a titioned trials 1, 2, and 3
into the first block* masls
The analysis oi I • era inds oj s B and C considered the demands
of the more successful of the two plays i.e., the "strong" player, desig-
nated "<£") and the dcsmands of t Less sue ful player (i.e., the "weak"
player,, "C"). Tl mly significant affects were for blocks (F(3. 90) = 11.37,
£ < .00001} and for trials (F(ll, 660) * 3.73, £ < ,00001). The conditions
effect, was not significant and indicated tha he different conditions had
little impact on the weak players 8 demands, although the blocks by "strong"/
"weak" player interaction was not significant (F(l, 30) ~ 1.46, £ < .25} f the
means for each of the players for each of the blocks (see Table 3) indicated
that "B" , the successful of the two pla . demanded less than "C" in
each block. The fact that he was included in over s i percent of the agree-"
ments may have results : a lower nds. rd elusion,
in turn, accounts in large part for
.1 payoffs. Post hoc tests
of the significant B and significantly
reduced their demands fi n bloc] and not between
other blocks. The over; for be ntinuous
reduction in demands. Again, had Ls been included, their demands
may have been reduced even furthi i
Weak Coalitions
The final set of results focused on the number of coalitions which
formed between the weak players. A coalition for the weak players was
observed whenever both Weak players made an identical offer for the three-
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person coalition, and each weak player accepted the other's offer. Given
this operational definition- r. Few coa] formed between the
weak players* As expecte* e freq counts shown in Table 1 indicate
that more weak coalitions formed in I e condition e messages were
possible. Relaxation of this definition the observation of
more weak coalitions also res; : iclusion. For instance,
the number of three-way coal it osed by the weaker players
in the conditions where no messages allowed totalled 139, while in the
secret and announced messages conditions, three-person coalitions were
proposed 212 times,
DISCUSSION
At first glance, the data points are very different from the core.
Statistical tests are not even necessary to determine the significance of
the differences from the core payoff of 100. In addition, in only one
r
group did player A attain payoffs which were close to the core {in Condition
3 f his payoff at the twelfth trial • 59.99). However, agreements when
communication was not possible >ser to the core than agreements where
communication was possible. i analysis payoffs and the
demands indicated that ther ore in the conditions
where communication was not -amber of trials might
reveal the extent /filch thi 3 continue. In the presei
study- the initial expectati ities and infor-
mation availability would rease the ccoperatii tuation was
generally supported, especially ' - ailai >mmuni< n oppor-
tuntities. Removing the ability to communicate resulted in increased




Because the vN-M solution encompasses ntire pf space,, no single
outcome was observed to strict redictions . *" The data
patterns (i.e., Figure 4) indicate thai lults fall on an arc which
is part of a solution, and that differ* tication conditions promote
different outcomes in the solution. In • :oncemed
with the strong player's minimall; ible offer indicated that, on the
average, the strong player d below 40
of the 100 points. This also favors the implication ixiade by subsolutions
that the strong player has a criterion below which he will not go.
The results yielded several other interesting points. The fact that
player A did very well in Condition 3, where offers were announced, was some-
what surprising. Instead of aiding the weaker players , the added information
allowed player A to reap greater payoffs than he had received when the players
merely learned of the payoff division. There are at least two possible
explanations for this result: (1) The weaker players were able to build
tacit agreements to hold down player A's payoffs when ?: >rily learned how
poorly they were doing and (2) Each weaker player, as he heard the recent
offer made by his counterpart, attempted to better that offer on the very
next trial. This process di cur group whose payoffs
closely approximated the core tion 3. ier or both explanations,
however , may be val
It was also interestin -.layers ! demands as
the trials prog, stro • trials
progressed; the weal i their demands a* ials progressed.
The result: increase /offs for player A as the game progressed.. However,
this trend was not smooth, o the second trial in
Condition 3, where A's demands in The data yield some
evidence which might explain In the four groups which showed
an increase ir. A ; s demands (in two demands did not increase), it
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seemed that A was attempting to recoup the losses he had incurred on the first
trial due to his own low offer- ranee, in th coos . . reme group,
A demanded only 10 of the 100 points 02 first trial, while he was of
50 of the .100 points by each of th 3. Because he was bound to
his offer, a 10-90 agreement was s A demanded
of the 100 points, seemingly atte groups) to
obtain an average o i in 1 tie
first trial) for - 3 other groups showin ; 3
increase in A*- the first 1 moved from
a demand of 50 to a demand of 70, ai of 60 on the first
trial* This explanatii admii I and f ;h is
necessary to confirm or disconfirm si • >n.
The present results can also be inter; additional information
on the elusive concept ewer. In this game, player A was very powerful -
he had to be include- n a agr€ Lch was reached. He did not hold
as much power as a dictator because he coal reive i€ ayoff without
a partner. However, he did hold a monopoly. He was not subject, for example,
to the possibility of being shut Ly, which is the case for an Apex
player [7] . Player deuced by the the core
for the game gives the er. other players
.
Another often used measure of value, indicates
that he holds the strono :md and proposes thai three time
as much of the payoff as aither of the twt ers. Yet, in several of
the conditions in the preses ar A received average payoffs which
only slightly exceeded fifty percent of the payoff. The conditions have bee
shown to have influenced the results. In addition, however, other variables
which were not investigated present study may have influenced th
magnitude of A's payoffs. Social psychological theories (e.g. , .[10],
predict that the, payoffs of a monopolist or a Dictator
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will increase as the size of the group increases. Where the present study
considered the smallest of n-person groups , research on larger groups is
needed to explore this crucial variable. Indeed, the effects of the
communication aud information conditions used in the present study might
be severely moderated by larr roups.
Other variables also a udy. The cts of face-to- face
bargaining, personality characteristics , and perceived status may all
impinge upon the results in an n-person game. However,, the differences
in games begs for further research more than any of these. A taxonomy of
games, which incorporates both the strategic and psychological systems
which lie behind the facade of the characteristic function, is a necessity
in the near future of the experimental study of games. Do the results of
the present game, for instance, generalize to games where no player holds
a monopoly? To games between experienced players? The questions are nearly
endless. Research is needed to answer these questions. And a synthesis of
the mathematical and the psychological points of view might make this
synthesis more meaningful to both areas.
To summarize, then, it is clear that an increase in the amount of
information and especially the ability to communicate helped to foster
greater cooperation between the weaker players. It was difficult to
establish trust without commui ication or information of some kind and,
even with some information, the strong player often reaped most of the
payoffs. The strong player in meet cases would not accept offers below
a certain criterion, supporting an implication from subsolutions . Finally,
as the bargaining continued, the payoff configurations did move closer to
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1. The term "solution concept >e used throughout the paper to
indicate the general sets which different theor •} positions espouse
as predicted, stable outcomes. j ' should be differ-
entiated from von Neumann and Morgenstern ' s solution set.
2. For the game in question, the s a unique point which coincides
with the bargaining set,, the kernel, and the competitive bargaining set.
The relationships which are found between the core and the data will
apply to each of these solution concepts,
3. The ordering is intuitive in every case except between Condition 3,
no messages-announced payoff division-announced offers, and Condition 4,
secret messages-announced payoff division-secret offers. Before conducting
the study, it was a moot point whether the opportunity to pass messages or
the knowledge of the other players" offers would lead to greater or less


























































































































































































The means for the strong player's minimal table offer for the









Secret Message 49.4be 52 . L
Announced Message 43.9
be
Note: Cells sharing a common subscript are not significantly different from
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1. The outcome set X = { {x„ , x^ ? x_) - 100; x . x . x > 10}ABC A B ABC
2. The dominion of a typical point x.
3. The design. For example, Condition 3 included announced payoff
division, no messages „ and announced offers,
4. The mean outcomes obtained under each of the experimental conditions,
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